The Historical Roots of German Climate Policy
Germany's climate leadership is quite remarkable when one considers that Germany belonged to the laggards when "modern" environmental policies first began to be developed in the 1960s. At that time, the United States, Japan, Sweden, and to some extent Great Britain were at the forefront in establishing new environmental institutions, procedures, instruments, standards, and technologies. Learning from these pioneers, Germany did, however, relatively quickly catch up, especially in the area of air pollution control policy (Weidner, 2002) . The biggest triggers for change were the widespread damages to health (smog) and nature (acid rain) caused by air pollution, the shock of the two oil price crises (1973 and 1979) that highlighted the problem of the German economy's strong dependence on unsure foreign sources, and growing opposition to the country's growing reliance on nuclear energy. In the 1970s, the country was riveted by huge mass rallies (sometimes with more than 100,000 participants). There were major clashes between the increasingly strong environmental movement and developers backed by a political and economic establishment that belonged to a neocorporatist network made up of members of the highest levels of the bureaucracy, political parties, central business federations, and trade unions.
The German environmental movement, which was very different in flavor from that in Japan or the United States, began quite early on to organize itself politically (see Raschke, 1993) . As early as 1977, green groups participated (as "green lists") in elections to district parliaments. In the European elections of 1979, several such groups put up candidates with a "green label," attracting almost one million votes. Also in 1979, the first representative of a green party (Bremer Green List) entered the parliament of a state (city-state of Bremen). Prior to 1982, green representatives had been elected into five state parliaments, and in 1983, they made it into the national parliament. In the turbulent years of the rise of the green party, environmental issues triggered major and partly violent conflicts. Since the late 1980s, a more cooperative policy style has developed between the various actor groups and institutions. Indeed, environmental interests and their proponents have become largely integrated in established institutions and processes. Certainly in the early 1980s, almost no one would have imagined that radical or left eco-activists would someday become heads of environmental agencies, ministers, and even foreign ministers. This high integrative capacity of the German political system and the willingness of the "organized" green movement to become more cooperative are important features explaining the mostly cooperative climate policy that followed in the 1980s. The integration of a green political party in the political-administrative system distinguishes Germany from the United States and Japan. The rise of the green party is connected to Germany's federal structure and election system. The German election system is basically one of proportional representation (together with a relatively generous public funding system for political parties!). Once the 5% hurdle is overcome (with 5% of total votes), a party achieves representation in parliament. Beyond this, through the various European, national, state, and local elections, the multilevel federal system provides frequent opportunities for new parties to learn the game, get access to the established system, and receive financial benefits.
German federalism and the electoral system also tend to promote cooperation. The system of proportional representation makes it difficult for any single party to gain enough seats in the parliament to form a government by itself. Thus, coalition governments are a basic German feature. This system encourages negotiation and consensus politics on and between all levels of government, because it applies to all federal, state, and by and large local bodies. These very specific political-cultural preconditions have influenced Germany's policy style in the area of climate change. management, scientific, and technical capacities developed especially fast and continuously (Jänicke & Weidner, 1997) . It was also in this area that some of the hardest conflicts between societal actors took place and that the precautionary principle was used to justify stronger and more preventive control policies.
During the 1980s, West Germany became one of Europe's pacesetters in the development and introduction of air pollution control policies (especially focused on stationary sources) and technologies. It was also at this time that Germany became more progressively engaged in international negotiations on long-range transboundary air pollution and stimulated EU policy formulation. Since the 1980s, the emissions of a variety of air pollutants have dropped sharply, leading to a substantial and noticeable improvement of ambient air quality.
These developments have tied into German climate change and energy policies in a number of ways (Weidner, 2002) . First, the focus on air pollution from stationary sources and the massive social conflicts in this area led to a strong increase in all kinds of capacity for environmental management and control. This does concern not only the establishment of highly specialized institutions for research, implementation, and monitoring; the rapid development of an "abatement industry"; a broad monitoring network; and the enactment of "market-producing" laws and regulations but also the capabilities of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to exert influence in this policy arena.
Second, the precautionary principle (Vorsorgeprinzip) not only gained legal strength owing to court decisions and new laws but also gained strength in overall politicalsocietal importance. Experiences with air pollution control supported the "philosophy" of environmental proponents that a "risk-adverse" strategy is the best option in situations of scientific uncertainty about cause-and-effect relationships and prospects of immense irreparable environmental damage if action should come too late.
Third, it was demonstrated that even very demanding and costly measures to curb air pollution did not have the detrimental economic effects as were claimed by industry and the utility sector and their supporters in government, scientific institutions and trade unions. On the contrary, there was much evidence that the strict air pollution control policy favored employment, technological innovation, and generally a modernization of industrial branches involved. These developments led to a broad acceptance of the paradigm of "ecological modernization" as a win-win strategy in solving environmental problems (Weidner, 2005) .
Fourth, the confrontations with the utility sector demonstrated that even extremely powerful businesses are vulnerable. The strong power base of this sector was due to very specific German structures, partly dating back to the 1930s, which are characterized by very close and nontransparent public-private relationships, strong involvement of trade unions, and complex and tight relationships between some enterprises and local politicians (Mez, in press ). The utility sector (as well as the coal-mining industry) mobilized enormous amounts of resources to prevent tighter emission standards, although ultimately unsuccessfully. The Ordinance on Large Combustion Plants of 1983 forced utility owners not only to install state-of-the-art abatement technology (flue gas scrubbers) but also to retrofit existing large plants with this technology (retrofitting was completed by 1988). The impact of the Ordinance exceeded even optimistic expectations: SO 2 emissions from power plants dropped from 2 million to about 0.7 million tonnes (1990), and from 1982 to 1990, NO 2 emissions decreased by 70%.
Fifth, the rapid enactment and implementation of the then strictest air pollution control requirements for large combustion plants in Europe strongly benefited from changes in the party-political landscape with the entry of the Greens into parliament. Also important was that the social-democratic/liberal government was replaced by a conservative/liberal government, which was not so committed to the fossil fuel power sector as the social democrats (who had a strong constituency in the mining districts and a close relationship with miners' trade unions). In addition, air pollution had played an important role in the election campaign, and the new conservative government wished to "take the wind out of Green sails" by demonstrating its environmental commitment (Mez, 1995) . Last but not least, the public saw that strict (national) environmental regulations very rapidly stimulated the development of abatement technologies; created, in balance, positive economic effects (Wicke, 1989) ; and led to Europe-wide progress in air pollution control policy despite industry warnings to the contrary.
Finally, the salient place of air pollution and energy production in environmental conflicts remained after the unification of the two German states because of the heavy air pollution and massive waste of energy resources that characterized the former GDR. Reductions in emissions in the former GDR have contributed substantially to Germany's carbon emission reductions.
These experiences and events framed the climate change and renewable energy policy debate in Germany. When they reached the political agenda in the late 1980s and 1990s, there was much less skeptical discussion than in the United States about the conclusions published by scientific bodies, such as the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). The German public accepted that the increase of GHGs in the long term will lead to dramatic climatic and environmental effects and that anthropogenic emissions of GHGs are the major driving force behind climate change.
Global Climate Change Politics in Germany
The rise of climate change to an important political and public issue in Germany began in the mid-1980s (Beuermann & Jäger, 1996; Cavender & Jäger, 1993; Watanabe & Mez, 2004) . Numerous developments were significant for the relatively quick increase in political and public attention. As early as June 1978, the Federal Environment Agency (Umweltbundesamt [UBA]) organized an international expert conference on climate issues. The following year, a governmental committee, "Climate Weidner, Mez / German Climate Change Policy 361 Research," was established to coordinate climate research and advise the government. In 1986, the study group on energy of the prestigious German Physics Society (Arbeitsgruppe Energie -AKE -der Deutschen Physikalischen Gesellschaft -DPG) in a statement addressed to the public warned of an imminent climate catastrophe ("Warnung vor einer drohenden Klimakatastrophe"). Although its purpose in issuing this warning was most likely primarily to strengthen the position of nuclear power, the Chernobyl nuclear catastrophe, which took place shortly after its publication, meant it did not have its intended effect on the public. After this warning, the newsmagazine Der Spiegel started a series on the climate issue with a dramatic cover showing the symbolic Cologne Cathedral deluged in a flood ("Die Klima-Katastrophe," 1986).
The Chernobyl catastrophe, moreover, revealed fundamental deficits in the government's capacities for environmental protection. With national elections ante portas and intensifying public and scientific discourses on environmental matters, Helmut Kohl decided to demonstrate his government's environmental commitment by establishing, almost over night, a Ministry of Environment (June 5, 1986 ). This context may explain why the 1987 declaration of Chancellor Helmut Kohl's conservative-liberal coalition government was themed "Conserve the Creation." The chancellor especially stressed the importance of national and international environmental protection for the future development of society and economy. It was under this specific political-societal constellation that Kohl announced in March 1987 that the climate issue was among the world's most pressing environmental problems. In the elections of 1987, the existing coalition government succeeded in its bid to remain in power. The green party made sharp gains as well, increasing from 5.6% in 1983 to 8.3% of the vote.
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The establishment of the Ministry of Environment strengthened the institutional position of those administrators within the government who already were committed to global environmental issues and in particular protection of the ozone layer and acid rain abatement. Of great importance for the political and scientific debate was the special parliamentary investigation committee 3 on "Precautions for the Protection of the Atmosphere" (Enquete-Kommission des Bundestags "Vorsorge zum Schutz der Erdatmosphäre"). 4 Its work was widely esteemed and helped forge a climatefriendly consensus that made it possible to establish future political strategies, including the establishment of Germany's first CO 2 reduction goal. In its third and final report, "Protecting the Earth," issued in 1990, the relevance of the climate issue was stated clearly: "Dramatic developments cannot be ruled out." 5 A follow-up parliamentary committee, "Protection of the Earth's Atmosphere," was set up in 1990 and worked through 1994. The federal government adopted the central recommendations of both committees.
In contrast to the discourse on Waldsterben, which was characterized by many competing and opposing expert opinions on causes and effects, in the case of climate change, a well-accepted agreement, shared not only by experts but also by governmental and economic actors, was rapidly forged. There was general consensus that climate change must be acknowledged as a real problem of growing importance, that it is caused primarily by the combustion of fossil fuels, and that the industrial countries bear the bulk of responsibility for both negative effects and abatement measures.
In 1990, the German government announced its intentions to strive to reduce CO ² emissions in West Germany by 25% of 1987 levels by 2005. An "Interministerial Working Group on CO ² Reduction" (IMA) was established with the task of developing proposals for how to reach this target. Significantly, the IMA was chaired by the Ministry of Environment (Beuermann & Jäger, 1996; Watanabe & Mez, 2004) . Although the German reunification process dominated the governmental and public agenda during the 1990s, efforts to develop a German GHG reduction strategy continued because of the work of the IMA. It was also clear that the highly inefficient and outdated energy structure of the former GDR provided good chances for a climate-oriented transformation.
In response to the new and challenging situation of a reunified Germany (October 3, 1990), the German government in 1995 announced a revised CO ² reduction target: 25% of 1990 levels by 2005. This reduction goal, because it was set by the government of a big industrialized country, attracted significant international attention. Germany strategically announced its pledge during COP 1 to the U.N. climate negotiations hosted by the German government in Berlin in 1995. This step revitalized the stagnating Kyoto Protocol negotiations and strengthened the position of the German proponents of climate policy. Economic actors were compensated by acceptance of their demand that domestic policy measures entail primarily voluntary commitments by industry to reduce CO ² emissions. Regulatory measures such as a heat usage ordinance and a CO ² tax were strongly opposed by industry.
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In Kyoto, individual targets for EU member states were not negotiated. Instead, the EU as a whole agreed to an 8% reduction of GHG emissions relative to 1990 levels by [2008] [2009] [2010] [2011] [2012] . In subsequent negotiations within the EU as to how this goal would be obtained, Germany took on the largest share of the reduction burden agreeing to a 21% reduction in its own GHG emissions during the same time frame. In 2002, Minister of the Environment, Jürgen Trittin, proposed that the EU agree to reduce its GHGs by 30% until 2020 compared to 1990 levels. If the EU agreed, Germany was prepared to work toward a 40% reduction (Bundesminister für Umwelt, Naturschutz und Reaktorsicherheit [BMU], 2003, p. 33) .
Climate Change Policy Under the Grand Coalition
Various events have helped to keep attention on climate after the Grand Coalition came to power in 2005, among them the publication of the Stern Report (Stern, 2006a (Stern, , 2006b ) and the IPCC Reports (IPCC, 2007) , the devastating effects of Hurricane Kyrill on Germany, and the Nobel Peace Prize being awarded to Al Gore and the IPCC. Change in government did not lead to a change in policy direction. If Weidner, Mez / German Climate Change Policy 363 anything, climate change has remained one of the German government's most prominent foreign policy issues.
On the occasion of the German Energy Summit held on July 3, 2007, Chancellor Angela Merkel declared climate protection to be the biggest challenge of the twentyfirst century (Die Tageszeitung, July 4, 2007, p. 8; Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, July 4, 2007, p. 9) . Although Germany's rate of GHG emissions (especially CO ² ) reductions slowed significantly in the mid-2000s after achieving sharp drops in the 1990s, in the lead up to the Heiligendamm G8 Summit (chaired by Germany) and with the presidency of the EU, the German government reconfirmed its declaration to reduce Germany's GHG emissions by 40% until 2020, this time dropping the contingency that this goal be dependent on other countries achieving a 30% reduction.
It was also primarily due to the persistent political activities of the German government that the EU adopted a 20, 20, 20 by 2020 goal: reducing EU GHG emissions by 20%, increasing energy efficiency by 20%, and enlarging the share of renewables in energy production to 20% of total energy consumption by 2020 (compared to a 1990 baseline). Germany's energy efficiency target (as set in the coalition treaty between the Christian Democrats and the Social Democrats) is an extremely big challenge for Germany: It means a doubling of energy efficiency between 1990 and 2020, which means achieving a 3% increase of energy efficiency per year. At present, the rate is about 1% per year. This target is unparalleled in history (WirtschaftsWoche No. 26 of June 25, 2007, p. 23 ).
German Climate Change Policies, Measures, and Instruments
Three basic factors are at the heart of German climate protection policies: a shift to low-emission fuels (renewables), the improvement of energy efficiency (efficiency gains in housing and transport, expansion of combined heat and power [CHP] ), and the control of emissions through the EU's Emissions Cap and Trading Scheme (ETS; Weidner & Eberlein, in press ). Germany has not shied away from strong, regulatory, and tax policies that impose significant costs on industry and the general population.
The most significant programs and policy structures were established during the red-green coalition (1998 to 2005), including the eco-tax and the "National Climate Protection Program of 2000," which was updated in 2005. On August 23, 2007, the new Federal Cabinet (a coalition of conservatives and social democrats) passed a demanding Integrated Energy and Climate Program, which included 29 steps, to achieve at least a 35% reduction in GHG emissions by 2020 (base year 1990). It also demonstrated in the "post-Kyoto" negotiations that took place in December 2007 in Bali, Indonesia, at the 13th Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC, its continued commitment to a progressive climate policy.
The most controversial instrument, the eco-tax, was enacted in 1999 and combined "green" policy targets with social-democratic concerns about job creation. The idea was to encourage energy savings and the development of energy-saving technologies, while at the same time making employment cheaper. It introduced a levy on electricity consumption (at a reduced rate for industry) and raised existing taxes on petrol, diesel, natural gas, and various mineral oils. Tax levels for petrol, diesel, as well as electricity increased in five steps until 2003. 7 The bulk of the revenuerising from € € 4.3 billion in 1999 to a predicted € € 18.9 billion in 2009 (Bundesministerium der Finanzen [BMF], 2005)-is earmarked for transfer to the public pension system to lower the social security contributions paid by employers and employees, thus encouraging job creation. A small amount per year (€ € 200 million since 2006) was reserved for supporting renewable energy.
The eco-tax met with massive opposition from the business sector, and it was largely unpopular with the public. Its effectiveness and fairness were also compromised by a number of exemptions: The tax rates for industries are much lower than for the residential sector, and the tax is not based on the carbon content of fuels.
8 As a result of nationwide protests against the supposedly socially unfair effects of high fuel prices, in 2000 the government, moreover, was forced to introduce a one-time compensation mechanism for those hit hardest by the eco-tax (commuters and lowincome households). Although the government has ruled out further tax increases because of rising energy prices, the increased tax rates (2003 level) remain in place despite growing complaints as fuel prices rise. Still, the eco-tax has had a positive impact in terms of lowering emissions.
Other measures have been taken as well. The 2002 Energy Savings Ordinance set higher standards for new and old buildings in an integrated approach covering heating supply and demand, including warm water. Efficiency requirements for new buildings were introduced that exceed current levels by 30%. It also prescribed insulation levels and exchange of heating systems for older buildings (UBA, 2007) . A June 2007 revision of this ordinance made energy certification for buildings mandatory, designed to serve as an incentive to upgrade. The relaunched "CO 2 Building Rehabilitation Program" began to receive increased funding of 1.5 billion (compared to 360 million previously) per year (investment grants and tax relief) beginning in 2007.
Finally, Germany has drawn on its long-standing but not very successful (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2003; Wurzel, Jordan, Zito, & Brückner, 2003) tradition of industrial self-regulation to experiment with voluntary industry commitments to reduce CO 2 emissions and to expand the share of CHP installations (cogeneration). In 1995, the German Industry Federation (BDI) signed a first commitment declaration after the government agreed not to introduce a carbon tax. It was revised in 1996 and then updated again in 2000 and amended in 2002. The 2000 agreement pledged to achieve a 28% reduction of CO 2 emissions compared to 1990 levels by 2005. Furthermore, for the six GHGs listed in the Kyoto Protocol, specific emissions were to be reduced by 35% of 1990 levels by 2005. In 2002, an amendment concerning CHP promotion stipulated that measures in this area were to reduce the six Kyoto gases by 45 million tons of CO 2 equivalents from 1998 to 2010-2012. Achievements were to be monitored by independent institutes.
The success of these agreements has been mixed at best. German industry, for example, did not comply with the specific CHP commitments (of 2001 and 2004) to reduce CO 2 emissions by 20 million tons by 2005. Instead, energy industry emissions rose by 30 million tons. Furthermore, the German automobile industry did not comply with its (EU-level) voluntary commitment concerning the reduction of CO 2 in exhaust gases.
Today's single most important energy-related climate policy instrument, however, is the EU's ETS. This is somewhat ironic given that initially Germany was very skeptical about emissions trading. When in 1996 the United States started to push for the introduction of emissions trading into the negotiation of the Kyoto Protocol, opposition was voiced not only by Germany but also at the EU level. There was concern that this instrument might be abused as a right to pollute and would therefore not be as effective as a regulatory policy. In the end, the EU countries agreed to emissions trading, however only as a complementary instrument to keep the United States on board (Oberthür & Ott, 1999) . Germany remained skeptical with respect to potential pitfalls of emissions trading also during the negotiations of an EU system that followed the Kyoto conference. This was also due to pressure from the energy sector and other GHG intensive industries that preferred voluntary agreements (Schafhausen, 2007) .
The basic idea of the EU ETS is that individual countries, subject to EU approval, allocate emission permits to energy and industrial installations. The ETS allows companies that exceed their quota to buy certificates from companies with excess permits. The German ETS covers about 55% of total CO 2 emissions and includes most industrial installations and larger power plants (but excludes transport, households, and services) (Ziesing, in press ). However, the German National Allocation Plan for the first ETS period (2005 to 2007) was far too generous to coal-fired power plants. 9 This shifted the reduction burden to the transport and households sectors, and hence to individual consumers, to the benefit of large industry emitters. The second National Allocation Plan (2008 to 2012), enacted in June 2007, led to a tightening of the cap, mainly because of the intervention of the European Commission (cf., Rat von Sachverständigen für Umweltfragen [SRU], 2008, pp. 149 ff.). It requires an 8% reduction for industry and energy (compared to current emissions). Further improvements for the second period include that 10% of all permits in Germany will no longer be grandfathered for free to installations but sold by auction (BMU, 2007) . It is interesting that not only the Ministry of Economy but also the Ministry of Environment opposed the introduction of auctioning.
10 Although the ETS is the main economic instrument in German climate policy, the government has up to now not commissioned any studies on its distributional effects.
As the overview in Table 2 shows, Germany has drawn on a wide variety of policy measures in the implementation of its climate protection commitments. Compulsory regulatory measures feature prominently in Germany's public policy toolbox. Subsidies have also taken on an important role. Although their effects are difficult to quantify, these strong measures have arguably been effective in reducing emission levels, notwithstanding open questions about the cost effectiveness and distributional effects of some measures. And even the (theoretically) "purely" economic instrument, ETS, adopted features of a "bureaucratic monster" under the pressure of public utilities and industrial lobbying. The system has become highly complicated, overregulated, and intransparent (Ziesing, in press ). 
Achievements in Renewable Energy Sources (RES)
In the 1980s, a strong environmental movement, the spread of green ideas throughout society, and the rise of the green party helped to push RES as an alternative to a nuclear plutonium economy, not merely as another additional source. Under pressure from this movement, governments first reluctantly but then with increasing enthusiasm began to support the development of RES.
The aggressive promotion of RES is probably the most significant and successful policy measure in the fight against climate change (Mez, in press) .
German leadership in the area of RES-based electricity (RES-E) has contributed substantially to the country's climate change policy successes. During the energy crises of the 1970s, coal and nuclear were nursed to impressive dimensions, politically as well as economically (Karlsch & Stokes, 2003) . This policy led to intense controversies, the rise of a strong antinuclear movement, and after the first oil price crisis in 1973, growing public support for RES. Altogether, despite sometimes rather aggressive conflicts between proponents and opponents of RES, there is strong acceptance and support of RES (Reiche, 2004) .
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The primary tool to enhance the share of renewables has been a strong feed-in tariff system in electricity generation that provides renewable producers with a guaranteed, attractive rate for electricity production and ensures access to the power grid. This system has received much praise but also attracted some criticism. The argument is that guaranteed rates (while declining over time according to a fixed digression rate) have been too generous (especially for solar power that contributes relatively little capacity) and that the continuation of long-term subsidies does not put enough pressure on prices. There is also the issue of cost to customers who are expected to pay about 10 eurocents per kWh for the feed-in tariff by 2012 (for details, see International Energy Agency [IEA], 2007, pp. 68-70 ). Yet notwithstanding concerns about the cost effectiveness of this program, it has had a high output success and was also adopted by many other countries.
When the Social Democratic-Green Party coalition government came into office in 1998, some of its parliamentarians took measures to improve the economics of RES-E. They drew in new actors into the RES policy network, including environmental associations, the renewable energy sector (equipment producers, owners and operators of installations, and their associations), and "conventional" associations (investment goods industry association Verband Deutscher Maschinen-und Anlagenbau and the metalworkers' union).
The "100,000 Roofs" Program was adopted in January 1999. It provided through 2003 reduced loans for photovoltaics (PV) roof installations through the federally owned Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau bank group. Combined with the feed-in tariff system, it resulted in 350 Megawatts (MWs) of solar power installations. The "Market Incentives Program for Renewables" launched in 1999 was designed to promote the use of biomass, solar energy, and geothermal energy in heat generation through grants and loans. As of the end of 2005, funding had been provided for more than 421,500 solar collector systems and 60,000 small-scale biomass boilers (IEA, 2007, p. 71) . The promotion of CHP (CHP Law 2002; see Watanabe & Mez, 2004, p. 11) has been another priority area. In transportation, tax breaks on biofuels were granted, and in 2006, a biofuel-admixing obligation for diesel and gasoline were introduced. The latter, however, was eased when it turned out that more than 2 million cars would run the risk of motor damage.
Germany surpassed its 2010 target to have renewables provide 4.2% of primary energy supply by (IEA, 2007 . In absolute terms, in 2007, German wind power installations represented more than a third of the total stock worldwide; for solar photovoltaics, the figure is similarly impressive. Including hydro, renewables supplied about 14.5% of electricity generated in Germany.
The federalist structure has provided some impetus to renewable energy policy development. Not only towns and cities but, as a rule, Länder also run their own programs to promote the spread of renewable energy. Some of these programs have been particularly impressive. In 1987, North Rhine-Westphalia started a program to promote renewable energy. It became a model for other Länder and influenced developments on the federal level as well. In the 1990s, North Rhine-Westphalia had the highest installation figures in Germany for wind power, photovoltaics, and solar thermal installations (Hirschl, 2007, p. 99) . It had a 1,000 roof program and a program subsidizing 100 MW-later 250 MW-wind turbines.
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Solar activists and municipal utilities have also influenced national policy developments. The 1989 modification of the federal framework regulation for electricity tariffs permitted utilities to conclude cost-covering contracts for electricity using renewable technologies, even if these "full cost rates" exceeded the long-term avoided costs of the utilities concerned. Because the supraregional utilities generally rejected this approach, local activists petitioned local governments to impose such contracts on municipal utilities. Several dozen cities opted for this model, including Bonn and Nuremberg. As the process first started in Aachen, this is known as the "Aachener model" (Solarenergie-Förderverein, 2002) . Additional help came from several Länder market introduction programs, most strongly in North Rhine-Westphalia.
In balance, the federalist structure contributed to the growth of renewable energy in Germany. German states have found it to be in their self-interest to demand supportive national standards and requirements to support their renewable energy sector. Many of these states are governed by a conservative administration. This might explain, in part, why the national conservative party showed strong support for renewable energy when it became the slightly larger part of the coalition government in 2005.
Climate-friendly energy policy has made Germany a world market leader for some areas of renewable energy technology (such as wind and photovoltaics). In recent years, the German energy feed-in law for renewables has been adopted by about two thirds of EU member countries as well as in many other non-EU countries. International conferences on renewables-initiated and organized by Germanyhave supported this development and further improved the chances for German technology in the market. Germany's provision of low-interest loans amounting to billions of Euros also helped to increase this trend (see Renewable Energy Policy Network for the 21st Century, n.d.; SRU, 2005, p. 7).
Multi-Level Governance: From the EU Down to the Village
Germany provides a good example of how in Europe today environmental policies are crafted and implemented across multiple levels of government. As a rule, responsibilities for energy and climate regulations are divided (or combined) between the EU (which itself is characterized by a highly complex and often intransparent decision process), the federal (central) government, the 16 federal Länder, and the local level with its more than 12,300 municipal entities with self-administration privileges guaranteed by the constitution (art. 28 Grundgesetz [GG] ). Their environment-related tasks include mandatory and voluntary duties, which they perform "in their own right." However, because of constitutional changes in responsibilities and historic rules (especially with respect to energy), it is the central government that has primary responsibility for determining climate change policies. Unlike the United States, in Germany, in most cases, the federal government is the "pusher in climate policy." Surprisingly enough, this legally complicated multilevel governance system usually does not lead to serious conflict between the various levels or stalemates in policy making. This is to a large extent the result of close-knit, formalized, and long-standing cooperation networks among the levels of responsibility in Germany.
Although there are some important exceptions, the overall positive cooperative atmosphere between German and EU administrative levels is largely due to their sharing common goals and comparable commitments in climate policy. The EU Commission has been a clear supporter of an active EU climate change policy (Berger et al., 2007; Schreurs, 2004; Schreurs & Tiberghien, 2007) .
Although since the late 1990s, it has often been the German government that has initiated ambitious target setting at the EU level (often in cooperation with the other "climate-progressive" member states) as it did with its double-presidency of the EU and G8 Summit 2007 in Heiligendamm, there are times when "Brussels" acts as the decisive pusher. It was the EU Commission, for example, that pushed for EU-wide CO 2 standards for automobiles and strengthening of the second phase of the ETS. In these cases, the German government yielded to the pressure of the domestic car industry and energy producers and sought a weakening of policy goals and exemptions for specific industries from regulations. The EU Commission (and Parliament), however, defended relatively successfully the originally envisaged climate policy targets (Long & Kaminskaite-Salters, 2007) . With respect to the second phase of the ETS, it was the EU Commission that prevented "the destruction of the integrity of a whole system" (SRU, 2008, p. 142) , eliminating the strong bias in favor of large emitters found in the German National (Emission) Allocation Plan. With these corrections, it was possible "to restore to a large extent the credibility of the emission trading system as an instrument of European climate protection policy" (Long & Kaminskaite-Salters, 2007, p. 152) .
In contrast to the case in many other environmental policy areas, the 16 federal Länder have almost no implementation responsibilities with respect to central climate change policies. Therefore, implementation deficits caused by specific Länder interests and capacities generally do not arise. Lower tier authorities basically have only two means of influence: establishment of their own (additional) measures affecting GHG emissions and-in rather rare cases-use of their veto power in the second chamber ("Bundesrat") against federal government initiatives, for instance in the area of automobile taxes.
14 All in all, climate policy in Germany has been primarily by top-down governance. This has not been difficult, however, as the central government's policy has been generally well accepted by the Länder. In their joint conference on March 22, 2007, the federal and Länder governments jointly drew up the "Düsseldorfer Erklärung" (the Dusseldorf Declaration), outlining the new and demanding national (and EU) climate targets. Relatively close and continuous cooperation between central and Länder governments are aided by a biannual Conference of Environmental Ministers and central-state government working groups (Bund-Länder-Arbeitskreis). Meanwhile, each of the 16 Länder has a comprehensive climate protection plan (often with concrete targets) (Deutscher Bundestag, 2005, pp. 29-33; Jörgensen, 2002) .
Although the degree of support for climate policy varies from state (Land) to state (Land), there is no state that stands out for its opposition to federal initiatives. More common is Länder support for those policies that fit favorably with special state interests and capacities, as is the case with renewable energy. Länder with a flourishing "green industry" like Schleswig-Holstein (wind power), Lower Saxony (wind power and biogas), Bavaria (hydro power and photovoltaic), Brandenburg (biomass), and North Rhine-Westphalia (waste and landfill gas) of course have a strong interest in (especially subsidy-based) demanding regulations for renewables. Nearly all of these Länder have a conservative government. There are only a very few examples of Länder policy action stimulating national legislative change.
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In 2004, when the Renewable Energy Sources Act (RESA) was reviewed and came to the Bundesrat, the Länder ruled by conservative governments opposed the bill. The Bundestag majority could simply have insisted on its version. However, the red-green coalition negotiated with the conservatives in an effort to secure support for maintaining RESA beyond 2007. Finally, the conciliation committee was content with some modest changes (exclusion of low-wind zones from the feed-in tariff), and the bill was adopted in both houses. In the Bundesrat, it received the support of many conservative Länder governments that voted against the national leadership of their party. The chief changes introduced by RESA 2004 are a general strengthening of generators vis-à-vis the utilities, reduction for rates for onshore wind, improved rates for offshore wind, and the inclusion of larger hydro plants. BadenWuerttemberg pushed the red-green federal government to include hydropower plants up to 150 MW in the amendment (Lauber & Mez, 2007, p. 187) .
The 2005 coalition agreement between the Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands and Christlich-Soziale Union in Bayern (CDU-CSU) and Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschland (SPD) made clear that its renewable electricity policies would continue in the footsteps of the red-green coalition. In 2007, the share of renewable energy was 6.7% of total primary energy consumption, 14.2% of electricity generation, and 8.5% of final energy consumption (BMU, 2008, p. 3) . The employment effect of the renewables sector is estimated at 249,000 jobs, and the avoided CO 2 emissions by renewables increased from 98 million tons (2006) to 115 million tons in 2007 (BMU, 2008, p. 3). All Länder with "green industries" are beneficiaries of this policy.
German municipalities also have become increasingly active in climate-related matters, very often via Local Agenda 21 activities and energy policies. Their contribution to climate protection depends strongly on personal factors, especially having a highly committed mayor, financial capacities, and the involvement of environmental organizations and their networking capabilities. Municipalities have focused on provision of information about available subsidies and technologies (www.dstgb.de), retrofitting public buildings (altogether 40,000 schools and 48,000 kindergartens), contracting of heat and electricity, changing street lighting to more energy efficient forms, promoting public transport and public fleets, green public procurement (www.greenlabelspurchase.net), and the promotion of renewable energy and cogeneration via municipal power plants (Stadtwerke). Small-and medium-sized municipalities 16 increasingly want to become pioneers of "zero-energy consumption." Numerous initiatives in municipalities in all Länder aim at a 100% renewable energy supply. And a number of smaller municipalities (e.g., Freiamt, Jühnde, and Mauenheim) have already realized this target. The Barnim and Uckermark ("Barum") region in Brandenburg, with a combined population of more than 300,000 inhabitants, has also achieved an all renewable electricity supply for the region (Mez et al., 2007, pp. 164 ff.) . Scenarios and projections for a complete energy supply on the base of renewables have been published for Rhineland-Palatinate (Hug, 2007) as well as for Germany as a whole (Waffenschmidt, 2007) . In nearly all cases, the initiative for these plans was taken by engaged citizens, partly organized in environmental associations like Bund für Umwelt und Naturschutz Deutschland (Friends of the Earth Germany) or Greenpeace. Still, only in a few cases have these goals been adopted by regional public bodies or municipalities (Mez et al., 2007, p. 168) . Without active support from local political structures, energy autonomy targets are unlikely to be realized. On the positive side, a growing number of local politicians of all parties have started to support the 100% renewables initiatives.
Although the German states and communities have been known to stimulate national policies (especially in renewable energy matters) with innovative measures, since the late 1990s, it is mainly the federal government that has forged ahead in climate policy. Although the automobile industry was able to mobilize the chancellor and various ministries (including even the Ministry of the Environment!) against stringent CO 2 emission targets for automobiles, industrial lobby groups have been unsuccessful in their bid to overturn the government's ambitious energy efficiency target (set in 2007). And even though the government is still criticized by large NGOs, there are no cases of NGOs successfully mobilizing the public to demand stricter regulations than those planned by the government. Moreover, although NGOs have emphasized global justice for a long time as a general principle of policy, they have not yet initiated a national discourse on the redistributional effects (equity) of German climate policy. In general, it can be said that NGOs have provided the government with "positive background noise" and cooperated quite closely with governmental institutions at both local and national levels. In sum, "top-down governance" or "governance by government" can be considered a defining feature of German climate policy.
Conclusion and Future Outlook
The German public has been largely supportive of the German government's initiatives. An increased perception of vulnerability to climate change appears to Weidner, Mez / German Climate Change Policy 373 motivate German citizens to be willing to "go out on a limb" in the hopes of spurring necessary global efforts. Germany's vulnerability to the physical effects of climate change is in fact much lower than the risk to the United States, Japan, Australia, or Spain. However, risk perceptions among the population are rather high: 75% are afraid of warlike conflicts in other countries about water and other resources, and 47% are afraid of the negative consequences of the greenhouse effect for themselves and their families (BMU, 2006b) . Although no serious energy shortage has occurred since the oil price crises in the 1970s, a clear majority of those surveyed (59%) considers making Germany independent of oil and gas supplies through an increase in the share of renewable energy the most important environmental political task of the federal government (BMU, 2006a) .
There is also the issue of the perceived economic costs of action: In Germany, in contrast with many other places, climate action is not necessarily considered to be an economic burden. To date, the absolute additional financial burden on the average household has been rather small (BMU, 2008) , although it has increased in the form of a growing tax burden. Still, although certain measures, such as the eco-tax, have clear and distinct costs, there is a growing belief that the broader efforts to move to cleaner technologies has created economic "winners" as well. 17 There are now flourishing green technology and renewable energy sectors that have created tens of thousands of new jobs. In addition, the dependency on the world energy market for fossil resources is decreasing, reducing Germany's economic-political vulnerability. Thus, a structural change toward a climate-sensitive energy policy has been adopted with almost no social conflicts. These positive employment and foreign energy policy effects of climate-related policies have played an important role in the public's climate change discourse.
Both the government and the proponents of a strong global climate change policy have provided the public with considerable information about the net positive benefits for the country as a whole of its climate programs but only with sparse information about the expected distributional effects (costs and benefits) of present and planned policies and international commitments for specific groups and regions. In sharp contrast to the salient role global equity concerns are playing in the political discourse on climate change, the issue of equity within Germany has been almost completely neglected by most proponents of progressive climate policy as well as academic circles. With most of the "low hanging fruit" already harvested, whether these favorable conditions will prevail in the post-Kyoto period will depend to at least some extent on the government's ability to manage equitably the climate change policy burdens that will affect society in the future.
In sum, German climate policy can be explained by the combined effects of a certain "path dependency"; "enlightened, far-sighted self-interest" (ecological modernization); a basic moral preference for "equity" as an organizing principle; and the "opaqueness" of the distributional effects of climate policy within Germany. villages either have introduced or completed very progressive policies to reduce energy consumption (e.g., Freiamt, Marburg).
16. About 70% of the population live in municipalities with less than 100,000 inhabitants. 17. This again is reminiscent of California's example, where legislation mandating emissions reductions was projected by some models to save more in efficiency gains than it would cost, producing a net positive economic effect as well (see Mazmanian et al., 2008) .
